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Abstract
Adversarial training (AT) is among the most effec-
tive techniques to improve model robustness by
augmenting training data with adversarial exam-
ples. However, the adversarially trained models
do not perform well enough on test data or under
other attack algorithms unseen during training,
which remains to be improved. In this paper, we
introduce a novel adversarial distributional train-
ing (ADT) framework for learning robust models.
Specifically, we formulate ADT as a minimax op-
timization problem, where the inner maximization
aims to learn an adversarial distribution to charac-
terize the potential adversarial examples around
a natural one, and the outer minimization aims to
train robust classifiers by minimizing the expected
loss over the worst-case adversarial distributions.
We conduct a theoretical analysis on how to solve
the minimax problem, leading to a general algo-
rithm for ADT. We further propose three different
approaches to parameterize the adversarial distri-
butions. Empirical results on various benchmarks
validate the effectiveness of ADT compared with
the state-of-the-art AT methods.
1. Introduction
Recent breakthroughs in deep neural networks (DNNs) have
led to substantial success in a wide range of fields, including
computer vision (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; He et al., 2016),
speech recognition (Graves et al., 2013), natural language
processing (Devlin et al., 2019), etc. However, DNN mod-
els are vulnerable to adversarial examples (Szegedy et al.,
2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015), which are indistinguishable
from natural examples but make a model produce erroneous
predictions. The adversarial vulnerability of DNNs limits
their practical applicability for various security-sensitive
applications, such as autonomous driving, healthcare, and
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finance. Therefore, it is essential to develop robust DNN
models that are resistant to adversarial examples.
Considerable efforts have been devoted to improving the
adversarial robustness of DNNs (Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Papernot et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2017; Liao et al., 2018;
Madry et al., 2018; Wong & Kolter, 2018; Pang et al., 2019;
Zhang et al., 2019). Among them, adversarial training (AT)
is one of the most effective techniques (Athalye et al., 2018).
Specifically, AT can be formulated as a minimax optimiza-
tion problem (Madry et al., 2018), where the inner maxi-
mization aims to find an adversarial example that maximizes
the classification loss for a natural one, while the outer min-
imization aims to optimize the model parameters using the
adversarial examples to train a robust classifier. To solve the
non-concave and typically intractable inner maximization
problem approximately, several adversarial attack methods
can be adopted, such as fast gradient sign method (FGSM)
(Goodfellow et al., 2015), projected gradient descent method
(PGD) (Madry et al., 2018).
However, the performance of the state-of-the-art AT meth-
ods is still unsatisfactory by showing only a modest level
of adversarial robustness. Recent work improves AT by ex-
ploiting more labeled and unlabeled data (Hendrycks et al.,
2019; Alayrac et al., 2019; Carmon et al., 2019). Neverthe-
less, in this work we focus on designing a more effective
training mechanism to tackle this problem, which is orthog-
onal to previous work on using more data. Moreover, most
AT methods solve the inner maximization using a specific
attack, which can result in poor generalization for other
attacks under the same threat model (Song et al., 2019). For
example, defenses trained on the naive FGSM adversarial
examples, without random initialization or early stopping
(Wong et al., 2020), are vulnerable to multi-step attacks
(Kurakin et al., 2017; Trame`r et al., 2018). Although PGD
is commonly adopted to evaluate the robustness of AT-based
defenses, some methods (e.g., Zhang & Wang (2019)) that
achieve the state-of-the-art robustness against PGD can still
be defeated by other attacks1. It indicates that these defenses
probably cause gradient masking (Trame`r et al., 2018; Atha-
lye et al., 2018; Uesato et al., 2018), and may be fooled
by stronger or adaptive attacks. In summary, there is still
1A discussion on it can be found at https://openreview.
net/forum?id=Syejj0NYvr&noteId=rkeBhuBMjS.
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a generalization problem across attacks in the existing AT
methods. It should be noted that we consider the general-
ization problem across attacks under the same threat model,
rather than studying the generalization ability across differ-
ent threat models (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019; Engstrom
et al., 2019; Trame`r & Boneh, 2019).
To mitigate the aforementioned problems of AT and improve
the model robustness against all possible adversarial attacks,
in this paper we introduce a novel adversarial distributional
training (ADT) framework. Unlike AT, we formulate ADT
as a different minimax optimization problem, where we
model the adversarial examples in the vicinity of a natural
input using a distribution. This distribution is capable of
characterizing heterogeneous adversarial examples around
the natural one. Then, the inner maximization problem of
ADT corresponds to finding an adversarial distribution for
each natural example by maximizing the expected loss over
this distribution, and the outer minimization problem aims
to learn a robust classifier by minimizing the expected loss
over the worst-case adversarial distributions.
Compared with the vanilla AT that generates an adversarial
example for each input using a single attack, ADT learns an
adversarial distribution that assigns probabilities for a large
adversarial region. This region potentially contains adver-
sarial examples given by various attack methods, such that
minimizing the expected loss over this region would lead to
a better generalization ability across attacks. Moreover, the
region covered by the adversarial distribution can help to
learn a smooth and flattened loss surface in the input space,
as shown in Figure 4. Consequently, ADT can improve the
overall robustness of the trained models over AT, without
sacrificing natural accuracy.
We perform a theoretical analysis on how to solve the mini-
max optimization problem in ADT, which indicates that the
minimax problem can be solved in a sequential manner simi-
lar to AT (Madry et al., 2018), leading to a general algorithm
for ADT. In particular, we can first find a maximizer (i.e.,
an adversarial distribution) of the inner problem and then
update the model parameters along the gradient direction of
the loss function at the maximizer of the inner problem. In
this paper, we implement ADT by parameterizing the adver-
sarial distributions with trainable parameters and propose
three different approaches to specify the parameterization
techniques and learning strategies, respectively.
We conduct extensive experiments and robustness evalua-
tions on the CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky & Hinton,
2009), and SVHN (Netzer et al., 2011) datasets to empir-
ically compare the adversarial robustness of the defense
models trained by ADT with the alternative state-of-the-art
AT models under both white-box attacks and black-box at-
tacks. The results validate the effectiveness of our proposed
methods on building robust deep learning models.
2. Proposed Method
In this section, we first introduce the background knowledge
of adversarial training (AT), then detail the proposed adver-
sarial distributional training (ADT) framework, and finally
provide a general algorithm for solving ADT.
2.1. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training has been widely studied to improve
the adversarial robustness of DNNs. Given a dataset D =
{(xi, yi)}ni=1 of n training samples with xi ∈ Rd and yi ∈
{1, ..., C} respectively being the natural example and the
corresponding label, AT can be formulated as a minimax
optimization problem (Madry et al., 2018) as
min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
δi∈S
L(fθ(xi + δi), yi), (1)
where fθ is the DNN model with parameters θ that outputs
predicted probabilities over all classes, L is a loss function
(e.g., cross-entropy loss), and S = {δ : ‖δ‖∞ ≤ } is a
set of allowed perturbations with  being the perturbation
budget. While we only focus on the `∞ norm constraint in
this paper, the extension to other norms is straightforward.
This minimax problem is usually solved sequentially, i.e.,
adversarial examples are crafted by solving the inner maxi-
mization first, and then the model parameters are optimized
based on the generated adversarial examples. Several attack
methods can be used to solve the inner maximization prob-
lem approximately. The fast gradient sign method (FGSM)
(Goodfellow et al., 2015) generates the adversarial pertur-
bation δ∗i using the loss gradient with respect to the input
as
δ∗i =  · sign(∇xL(fθ(xi), yi)). (2)
The projected gradient descent method (PGD) (Madry et al.,
2018) takes multiple gradient steps as
δt+1i = ΠS
(
δti + α · sign(∇xL(fθ(xi + δti), yi))
)
, (3)
where δti is the adversarial perturbation at the t-th step, Π(·)
is the projection function, and α is a small step size. δ0i is
initialized uniformly in S. For the T -step PGD, the final
adversarial perturbation is given by δ∗i = δ
T
i .
2.2. Adversarial Distributional Training
As we discussed, though effective, AT is not problemless.
On one hand, the performance of the state-of-the-art AT
methods is far from satisfactory. On the other hand, the gen-
eralization ability across attacks is poor. To alleviate these
problems, we propose to capture the distribution of adversar-
ial perturbations around each input instead of only finding a
locally most adversarial point for more generalizable adver-
sarial training, which is named as adversarial distributional
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training (ADT). In particular, we model the adversarial per-
turbations around each natural example xi by a distribution
p(δi), whose support is contained in S . Based on this, ADT
is formulated as the following distribution-based minimax
optimization problem as
min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
p(δi)∈P
Ep(δi)
[L(fθ(xi + δi), yi)], (4)
where P = {p : supp(p) ⊆ S} is the set of all possible
distributions with support contained in S. As can be seen
in Eqn. (4), the inner maximization aims to learn an adver-
sarial distribution, such that a point drawn from it is likely
an adversarial example. And the objective of the outer mini-
mization is to adversarially train the model parameters by
minimizing the expected loss over the worst-case adversarial
distributions induced by the inner problem.
The major difference between AT and ADT is that for each
natural input xi, AT finds a worst-case adversarial exam-
ple, while ADT learns a worst-case adversarial distribution
that assigns probabilities for a relatively large adversarial
region contained in S . Because adversarial examples can be
generated by various methods, we would expect that those
adversarial examples probably lie in the region covered by
the distribution. Training on the expected loss over this dis-
tribution can naturally lead to a better generalization ability
across attacks under the same threat model.
Furthermore, ADT is likely to be more effective than the
vanilla AT. The main reasons are as follows. AT in Eqn. (1)
only concerns the robustness at a locally most adversarial
point, but new adversarial examples may also emerge in
other regions due to the high non-linearity of DNNs. Al-
though PGD is shown to be a universal first-order adversary
(Madry et al., 2018), robustness against PGD cannot confer
robustness to attacks beyond the first-order adversaries. But
the adversarial distribution learned in ADT can characterize
adversarial examples in a large region, some of which are
not reachable by the first-order adversaries since they are
not local maximizers of the inner problem of AT. Training
on the expected loss over the adversarial distribution can
consequently help to learn a smoother and more flattened
loss surface around the natural examples in the input space,
as shown in Figure 4. Therefore, ADT can improve the
overall robustness compared with AT.
2.3. Regularizing Adversarial Distributions
For the inner maximization of ADT, we can easily see that
max
p(δi)∈P
Ep(δi)
[L(fθ(xi + δi), yi)]
≤ max
δi∈S
L(fθ(xi + δi), yi).
(5)
It indicates that the optimal distribution by solving the inner
problem of ADT will degenerate into a Dirac distribution.
Hence the adversarial distribution cannot cover a diverse set
of adversarial examples, and ADT becomes AT.
To solve the degeneration issue, we add an entropic regular-
ization term into the training objective (4) of ADT as
min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
p(δi)∈P
J (p(δi),θ), with (6)
J (p(δi),θ) = Ep(δi)[L(fθ(xi + δi), yi)]+ λH(p(δi)),
where H(p(δi)) = −Ep(δi)[log p(δi)] is the entropy of
p(δi) to increase its support and avoid the degeneration
problem. λ is a balancing hyperparameter. In Eqn. (6), we
let J (p(δi),θ) denote the overall loss function for notation
simplicity. We next provide a theoretical analysis on how to
solve problem (6), which leads to a general algorithm.
2.4. A General Algorithm for ADT
To solve minimax optimization problems, Danskin’s theo-
rem (Danskin, 2012) states how the maximizers of the inner
problem can be used to define the gradient directions for the
outer problem, which is also the theoretical foundation of
AT (Madry et al., 2018). But it is problematic to directly
apply Danskin’s theorem for solving ADT since the search-
ing space P of the inner problem does not meet the exact
assumptions of this theorem. As it is non-trivial to perform
a theoretical analysis on how to solve ADT, we first lay out
the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. The loss function J (p(δi),θ) is continu-
ously differentiable with respect to θ.
Assumption 1 is also made in Madry et al. (2018) for AT.
Although the loss function is not completely continuously
differentiable due to the ReLU layers, the set of discontinu-
ities has measure zero, such that it is assumed not to be an
issue in practice (Madry et al., 2018).
Assumption 2. The probability density functions of distri-
butions in P are bounded and equicontinuous.
Assumption 2 puts a restriction on the set of distributions P .
We show that the explicit adversarial distributions proposed
in Section 3.1 satisfy this assumption (in Appendix A.1).
Given these assumptions, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. We define
ρ(θ) = maxp(δi)∈P J
(
p(δi),θ
)
, and P∗(θ) = {p(δi) ∈
P : J (p(δi),θ) = ρ(θ)}. Then ρ(θ) is directionally differ-
entiable, and its directional derivative along the direction v
satisfies
ρ′(θ;v) = sup
p(δi)∈P∗(θ)
v>∇θJ
(
p(δi),θ
)
. (7)
In particular, when the set P∗(θ) = {p∗(δi)} only contains
one maximizer, ρ(θ) is differentiable at θ and
∇θρ(θ) = ∇θJ
(
p∗(δi),θ
)
. (8)
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Algorithm 1 The general algorithm for ADT
Input: Training data D, objective function J (p(δi),θ),
the set of perturbation distributions P , training epochs N ,
and learning rate η.
Initialize θ;
for epoch = 1 to N do
for each minibatch B ⊂ D do
Obtain p∗(δi) for each input (xi, yi) ∈ B by solving
p∗(δi) = arg max
p(δi)∈P
J (p(δi),θ).
Update θ with stochastic gradient descent
θ ← θ − η · E(xi,yi)∈B
[∇θJ (p∗(δi),θ)].
end for
end for
The complete proof of Theorem 1 is deferred to Appendix
A.1. Theorem 1 provides us a general principle for training
ADT, by first solving the inner problem and then updating
the model parameters along the gradient direction of the loss
function at the global maximizer of the inner problem, in a
sequential manner similar to AT (Madry et al., 2018). We
provide the general algorithm for ADT in Alg. 1. Similar
to AT, the global maximizer of the inner problem cannot be
solved analytically. Therefore, we propose three different
approaches to obtain approximate solutions, as introduced in
Section 3. Although we cannot reach the global maximizer
of the inner problem, our experiments suggest that we can
reliably solve the minimax problem (6) by our algorithm.
3. Parameterizing Adversarial Distributions
At the core of ADT lie the solutions of the inner maximiza-
tion problem of Eqn. (6). The basic idea is to parameterize
the adversarial distributions with trainable parameters φi.
With the parameterized pφi(δi), the inner problem is con-
verted into maximizing the expected loss with respect to φi.
In the following subsections, we elaborate three different
approaches to specify the detailed parametrizations and cor-
responding learning strategies, respectively. We provide an
overview of these approaches in Figure 1.
3.1. Explicit Modeling of Adversarial Perturbations
A natural way to model adversarial perturbations around an
input is using a distribution with an explicit density function.
We name ADT with EXPlicit adversarial distributions as
ADTEXP. To define a proper distribution pφi(δi) on S, we
take the transformation of random variable approach as
δi =  · tanh(ui), ui ∼ N (µi,diag(σ2i )), (9)
where ui is sampled from a diagonal Gaussian distribution
with µi,σi ∈ Rd as the mean and standard deviation. ui
is transformed by a tanh function and then multiplied by
𝜇" 𝜎" 𝑟
+/∗tanh,∗ 𝜖
𝛿"
x"
𝑟+/∗
tanh,∗ 𝜖𝛿"
𝑔1𝑟~𝑁(0, 𝐼)
𝑟~𝑁(0, 𝐼)
x" 𝑧
tanh,∗ 𝜖𝛿"𝑔1 z~𝑈(−1,1)
(a) (b) (c)
𝜇" 𝜎"
𝜙":
Figure 1. An illustration of the three different approaches to param-
eterize the distributions of adversarial perturbations. (a) ADTEXP:
the explicit adversarial distribution pφi(δi) is defined by trans-
formingN (µi, diag(σ2i )) via tanh followed by a multiplication
with . (b) ADTEXP-AM: we amortize the explicit adversarial distri-
butions by a neural network gφ taking xi as input. (c) ADTIMP-AM:
we define the implicit adversarial distributions by inputting an
additional random variable z ∼ U(−1, 1) to the network gφ.
 to get δi. We let φi = (µi,σi) denote the parameters to
be learned. We sample ui from a diagonal Gaussian mainly
for the sake of computational simplicity. But our method is
fully compatible with more expressive distributions, such
as matrix-variate Gaussians (Louizos & Welling, 2016) or
multiplicative normalizing flows (Louizos & Welling, 2017),
and we leave using them for future work.
Given Eqn. (9), the inner problem of Eqn. (6) becomes
max
φi
{
Epφi (δi)
[L(fθ(xi + δi), yi)]+ λH(pφi(δi))}.
To solve this, we need to estimate the gradient of the ex-
pected loss with respect to the parameters φi. A commonly
used method is the low-variance reparameterization trick
(Kingma & Welling, 2014; Blundell et al., 2015), which
replaces the sampling process of the random variable of in-
terest with the corresponding differentiable transformation.
With this technique, the gradient can be back-propagated
from the samples to the distribution parameters directly.
In our case, we reparameterize δi by δi =  · tanh(ui) =
 ·tanh(µi+σir), where r is an auxiliary noise variable fol-
lowing the standard Gaussian distribution N (0, I). There-
fore, we can estimate the gradient of φi via
Er∼N (0,I)∇φi
[
L(fθ(xi +  · tanh(µi + σir)), yi)
−λ log pφi
(
 · tanh(µi + σir)
)]
. (10)
The first term inside is the classification loss with the sam-
pled noise, and the second is the negative log density (i.e.,
estimation of entropy) which can be calculated analytically
(proof in Appendix A.2) as
d∑
j=1
(1
2
(r(j))2 +
log 2pi
2
+ logσ
(j)
i
+ log
(
1− tanh(µ(j)i + σ(j)i r(j))2
)
+ log 
)
,
(11)
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where the superscript j denotes the j-th element of a vector.
In practice, we approximate the expectation in Eqn. (10)
with k Monte Carlo (MC) samples, and perform T steps
of gradient ascent on φi to solve the inner problem. After
obtaining the optimal parameters φ∗i , we use the adversarial
distribution pφ∗i (δi), which characterizes the adversarial
perturbations around the natural input xi, to update model
parameters θ. The algorithm is outlined in Appendix B.1.
3.2. Amortizing the Explicit Adversarial Distributions
Although the aforementioned method in Section 3.1 pro-
vides a simple way to learn explicit adversarial distributions
for ADT, it needs to learn the distribution parameters for
each input and then brings prohibitive computational cost.
Compared with the vanilla AT which constructs adversarial
examples by T steps PGD (Madry et al., 2018), ADTEXP
is approximately k times slower since the gradient of φi is
estimated by k MC samples in each step. In this subsection,
we propose to amortize the inner optimization of ADTEXP,
to develop a more feasible and scalable training method.
We name ADT with the AMortized version of EXPlicit
adversarial distributions as ADTEXP-AM.
Specifically, instead of optimizing the distribution parame-
ters for each data xi, we opt to learn a mapping gφ : Rd →
P , which defines the adversarial distribution for each in-
put in a conditional manner pφ(δi|xi). We instantiate gφ
by a conditional generator network. It takes a natural ex-
ample xi as input, and outputs the parameters (µi,σi) of
its corresponding explicit adversarial distribution which is
also defined by Eqn. (9). The notable advantage of using a
generator to define pφ(δi|xi) is that the generator network
can potentially learn common structures of the adversarial
perturbations, which can generalize to new training samples
(Baluja & Fischer, 2017; Poursaeed et al., 2018) with the
similar characteristics. It means that we do not need to opti-
mize φ excessively on each data xi, which can accelerate
the training process.
By amortizing the explicit adversarial distributions, we can
rewrite the minimax optimization problem (6) as
min
θ
max
φ
1
n
n∑
i=1
{
Epφ(δi|xi)
[L(fθ(xi + δi), yi)]
+ λH(pφ(δi|xi))
}
,
(12)
where θ and φ are the parameters of the DNN classifier
and the generator, respectively. During training, we perform
stochastic gradient descent and ascent on θ and φ simulta-
neously, to accomplish adversarial training. To enable the
gradients flowing from δi to φ, we apply the same repa-
rameterization strategy as in Section 3.1. In practice, we
only use one MC sample for each data, with the detailed
algorithm described in Appendix B.2.
3.3. Implicit Modeling of Adversarial Perturbations
Since the underlying distributions of adversarial perturba-
tions have not been figured out yet and could be different
across samples, it is hard to specify a proper explicit distri-
bution to model adversarial perturbations, which may lead
to the underfitting issue. To bypass this, we resort to implicit
distributions (i.e., distributions without tractable probability
density functions but can still be sampled from), which have
shown promising results recently (Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Shi et al., 2018a;b), particularly in modeling complex high-
dimensional data (Radford et al., 2016; Isola et al., 2017).
The major advantage of implicit distributions is that they are
not confined to provide explicit densities, which intrinsically
improve the flexibility inside the sampling process.
Based on this analysis, we propose to use the implicit distri-
butions to characterize the adversarial perturbations of each
data xi. Considering the priority of amortized optimization,
we learn a generator gφ : Rdz ×Rd → Rd which implicitly
defines a conditional distribution pφ(δi|xi) by
δi = gφ(z;xi), (13)
where xi is a natural input and z ∈ Rdz is a random noise
vector. Typically, z is sampled from a general prior p(z)
such as the standard Gaussian or uniform distributions as in
the generative adversarial networks (GANs) (Goodfellow
et al., 2014). In this work, we sample z from a uniform distri-
bution U(−1, 1). We refer to this approach as ADTIMP-AM.
A practical problem remains untackled is that the entropy of
the implicit distributions cannot be estimated exactly as we
have no access to the density pφ(δi|xi). This leads to the
failure of naive optimization. An appealing alternative is to
maximize the variational lower bound of the entropy (Dai
et al., 2017a)2 for its simplicity and success in GANs (Dai
et al., 2017b). In our case, for a natural input xi, we can
similarly derive the following lower bound stemming from
the mutual information between the perturbation δi and the
random noise z (proof in Appendix A.3) as
H(pφ(δi|xi)) ≥ U(q) = Ep(z) log q(z|gφ(z;xi)) + c, (14)
where c is a constant and q(·|·) is an introduced variational
distribution. Maximizing U(q) can effectively maximize the
entropy termH(pφ(δi|xi)). In practice, we implement q as
a diagonal Gaussian, whose mean and standard derivation
are given by a ψ-parameterized neural network. Then we
have the final training objective as
min
θ
max
φ,ψ
1
n
n∑
i=1
{
Ep(z)
[L(fθ(xi + gφ(z;xi)), yi)
+ λ log qψ(z|gφ(z;xi))
]}
,
(15)
2We can also directly estimate the gradient of the entropy with
advanced techniques such as spectral Stein gradient estimator (Shi
et al., 2018b), and we leave this for future work.
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which is solved by simultaneous stochastic gradient descent
and ascent on θ and (φ,ψ). We also provide the detailed
training algorithm of ADTIMP-AM in Appendix B.3.
4. Related Work
Our work is related to some previous work in the literature.
Learning the distributions of adversarial examples has been
studied before, mainly for black-box adversarial attacks. In
Ilyas et al. (2018), an adversarial example is searched over a
distribution, similar to the inner problem of Eqn. (4). They
use natural evolution strategy to estimate the gradient for
black-box attacks. But their gradient estimator exhibits very
high variance compared with ours in Eqn. (10) (Kingma &
Welling, 2014). And our method is based on the white-box
setting (i.e., compute the gradient) rather than the black-box
setting. Li et al. (2019) further improve the query-efficiency
of black-box attacks by learning the distribution parameters.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to train robust
models by learning the adversarial distributions.
In this work, we adopt a generator network to amortize the
adversarial distributions for accelerating the training process.
There also exists previous work on using generator-based
approaches for adversarial attacks and defenses (Baluja &
Fischer, 2017; Poursaeed et al., 2018; Xiao et al., 2018).
Wang & Yu (2019) and Chen et al. (2018) propose to solve
the inner maximization problem of AT by generating adver-
sarial examples using a generator network, which are similar
to our work. The essential difference is that they still focus
on the minimax formulation (1) of AT, while we propose a
novel ADT framework in Eqn. (4). We empirically compare
our method with Chen et al. (2018) in Appendix D.4.
The proposed ADT framework is essentially different from
a seemingly similar concept, called distributionally robust
optimization (DRO) (Ben-Tal et al., 2013; Esfahani & Kuhn,
2018; Sinha et al., 2018). DRO seeks a model that is robust
against changes in data-generating distribution, by training
on the worst-case data distribution under a probability mea-
sure. DRO is related to AT with the Wasserstein distance
(Sinha et al., 2018; Staib & Jegelka, 2017). However, ADT
does not model the changes in data distribution but aims to
find an adversarial distribution for each input.
5. Experiments
To empirically validate the effectiveness of ADT on im-
proving the adversarial robustness of DNNs, we perform
extensive experiments on several benchmark datasets. All of
the experiments are conducted on NVIDIA 2080 Ti GPUs.
5.1. Experimental Settings and Implementation Details
We briefly introduce the experimental settings in this section,
and leave the full details in Appendix C.
Datasets. We choose CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky
& Hinton, 2009), and SVHN (Netzer et al., 2011) to conduct
experiments. The images are normalized to [0, 1]. We set the
perturbation budget  = 8/255 on CIFAR, and  = 4/255
on SVHN, as in Carmon et al. (2019).
Network Architectures. We use a Wide ResNet (WRN-28-
10) model (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016) as the classifier
in all of our experiments, following Madry et al. (2018). For
the generator network used in ADTEXP-AM and ADTIMP-AM,
we adopt a popular image-to-image architecture with resid-
ual blocks (Johnson et al., 2016; Zhu et al., 2017). We also
employ a 5-layer CNN to instantiate qψ in ADTIMP-AM.
Training Details. We adopt the cross-entropy loss as L in
our objective (6). We set λ = 0.01 for the entropy term,
and leave the study of the effects of λ in Section 5.4. For
ADTEXP, we adopt Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2015) for opti-
mizing φi with the learning rate 0.3, the optimization steps
T = 7, and the number of MC samples in each step k = 5.
For ADTEXP-AM and ADTIMP-AM, we adopt Adam with only
one MC sample for each data for gradient estimation.
Baselines. We compare the effectiveness of ADT with two
primary and representative baselines: 1) standard training
on the natural images (Standard); 2) AT on the PGD ad-
versarial examples (ATPGD) (Madry et al., 2018). We also
include the pretrained ATPGD model released by Madry et al.
(2018), which is denoted as ATPGD†. On CIFAR-10, we
further incorporate several additional baselines for compre-
hensive evaluations, including: 1) AT on the targeted FGSM
adversarial examples (ATFGSM) (Kurakin et al., 2017); 2)
adversarial logit pairing (ALP) (Kannan et al., 2018); and 3)
feature scattering-based AT (FeaScatter) (Zhang & Wang,
2019). We additionally compare with Zhang et al. (2019)
and Chen et al. (2018) in Appendix D.3 and D.4.
Robustness Evaluation. To evaluate the adversarial robust-
ness of these models, we adopt a plenty of attack methods,
and report the per-example accuracy as suggested in Carlini
et al. (2019), which calculates the robust accuracy by
Arob = 1
ntest
ntest∑
i=1
min
a∈A
I
(
arg max{fθ(a(xi))} = yi
)
,
where A is the set of tested attacks, a(xi) is the adversarial
example given by attack a, and I(·) is the indicator function.
5.2. Robustness under White-box Attacks
We first compare the robustness of the proposed methods
with baselines under various white-box attacks. We consider
FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015), PGD (Madry et al., 2018),
MIM (Dong et al., 2018), C&W (Carlini & Wagner, 2017),
and a feature attack (FeaAttack)3 for evaluation. C&W is
3https://github.com/Line290/FeatureAttack.
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Table 1. Classification accuracy of the three proposed methods and baselines on CIFAR-10 under white-box attacks with  = 8/255. The
last column shows the overall robustness of the models. We mark the best results for each attack and the overall results that outperform
the baselines in bold, and the overall best result in blue. We highlight the results of ATFGSM and FeaScatter in orange to emphasize that
these models have the generalization problem across attacks, whose overall robustness is weak.
Model Anat FGSM PGD-20 PGD-100 MIM C&W FeaAttack Arob
Standard 94.81% 12.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
ATFGSM 93.80% 79.86% 0.12% 0.04% 0.06% 0.13% 0.01% 0.01%
ATPGD† 87.25% 56.04% 45.88% 45.33% 47.15% 46.67% 46.01% 44.89%
ATPGD 86.91% 58.30% 50.03% 49.40% 51.40% 50.23% 50.46% 48.26%
ALP 86.81% 56.83% 48.97% 48.60% 50.13% 49.10% 48.51% 47.90%
FeaScatter 89.98% 77.40% 70.85% 68.81% 72.74% 58.46% 37.45% 37.40%
ADTEXP 86.89% 60.41% 52.18% 51.69% 53.27% 52.49% 52.38% 50.56%
ADTEXP-AM 87.82% 62.42% 51.95% 51.26% 52.99% 51.75% 52.04% 50.04%
ADTIMP-AM 88.00% 64.89% 52.28% 51.23% 52.64% 52.65% 51.89% 49.81%
Table 2. Classification accuracy of the three proposed methods and baselines on CIFAR-100 and SVHN under white-box attacks. We
mark the best results for each attack and the overall results that outperform the baselines in bold, and the overall best result in blue.
Model Anat FGSM PGD-20 PGD-100 MIM C&W FeaAttack Arob
CIFAR100,  = 8/255
Standard 78.59% 8.73% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
ATPGD 61.45% 30.78% 25.71% 25.40% 26.60% 25.80% 33.95% 24.49%
ADTEXP 62.70% 34.22% 28.96% 28.60% 29.83% 28.99% 35.07% 27.13%
ADTEXP-AM 62.84% 36.28% 29.01% 28.46% 29.68% 28.78% 34.91% 26.87%
ADTIMP-AM 64.07% 39.39% 29.40% 28.43% 29.64% 28.76% 35.00% 26.80%
SVHN,  = 4/255
Standard 96.12% 39.05% 3.64% 2.95% 4.08% 3.91% 2.14% 2.14%
ATPGD 95.07% 82.19% 74.22% 73.79% 74.56% 74.77% 73.51% 73.38%
ADTEXP 95.70% 86.72% 77.01% 76.62% 77.18% 77.50% 75.64% 75.55%
ADTEXP-AM 95.67% 85.24% 76.12% 75.58% 76.63% 76.70% 75.20% 75.00%
ADTIMP-AM 95.62% 86.73% 75.61% 74.85% 75.91% 76.12% 74.24% 74.13%
implemented by adopting the margin-based loss function in
Carlini & Wagner (2017) and using PGD for optimization.
We use 20 and 100 steps for PGD, 20 steps for MIM, and
30 steps for C&W. The step size is α = /4 in these attacks.
FeaAttack is a stronger attack for the defense FeaScatter.
The details of FeaAttack are provided in Appendix C.5.
On CIFAR-10, we compare the classification accuracy of
the proposed methods—ADTEXP, ADTEXP-AM, ADTIMP-AM,
and baseline models—Standard, ATFGSM, ATPGD, ATPGD†,
ALP, FeaScatter on natural inputs and adversarial examples
in Table 1. It is obvious that some AT-based methods exhibit
the generalization problem across attacks, i.e., ATFGSM and
FeaScatter, whose overall robustness is weak. But ADT-
based methods do not have this issue by showing consistent
robustness performance across all tested attacks. Although
ATPGD does not have this issue also, and achieves the best
performance among the AT-based defenses, the proposed
ADT reveals improved overall robustness than ATPGD, show-
ing the effectiveness of the proposed methods. We also show
the results on CIFAR-100 and SVHN in Table 2. The re-
sults consistently demonstrate that ADT-based methods can
outperform ATPGD under white-box attacks.
It can be further seen that ADTEXP is better than ADTEXP-AM
and ADTIMP-AM in most cases. We suspect the reason is that
amortizing the adversarial distributions through a generator
network is hard to deliver appropriate adversarial regions
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Figure 2. Classification accuracy (%) of the three proposed meth-
ods and baselines on CIFAR-10 under transfer-based black-box
attacks. The source model refers to the one used to craft adversarial
examples, and the target model is the one being attacked.
for every input, owing to the limited capacity of the gen-
erator. Nevertheless, it can accelerate the training, which
is shown in Appendix D.2. Note that ADTIMP-AM obtains
similar robustness with ADTEXP-AM. It indicates that though
the adopted implicit distributions enable us to optimize in
a larger distribution family and the optimization always
converges to local optima, learning in ADTIMP-AM does not
necessarily lead to better adversarial distributions and more
robust models.
5.3. Robustness under Black-box Attacks
Now we evaluate the robustness of the defenses on CIFAR-
10 under black-box attacks to perform a thorough evaluation
following the guidelines in Carlini et al. (2019). We first
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Table 3. Classification accuracy of the three proposed methods and
baselines on CIFAR-10 under the black-box SPSA attack with
different batch sizes. The perturbation budget is  = 8/255.
Model SPSA256 512 1024 2048
Standard 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
ATPGD 56.60% 53.50% 50.62% 47.83%
ADTEXP 58.67% 55.39% 52.67% 50.42%
ADTEXP-AM 58.67% 55.02% 52.30% 49.57%
ADTIMP-AM 58.58% 55.23% 52.19% 49.39%
evaluate transfer-based black-box attacks using PGD-20
and MIM. The results in Figure 2 show that these models
obtain higher accuracy under transfer-based attacks than
white-box attacks. We further perform query-based black-
box attacks using SPSA (Uesato et al., 2018) and report
the results in Table 3. To estimate the gradients, we set the
batch size as 256, 512, 1024, and 2048, the perturbation
size as 0.001, and the learning rate as 0.01. We run SPSA
attacks for a maximum of 100 iterations, and stop when
we cause misclassification. The results also show that the
accuracy is higher than that under white-box attacks. And
our methods obtain better robustness compared with ATPGD.
In summary, the results under black-box attacks verify that
our methods can reliably improve the robustness rather than
causing gradient masking (Athalye et al., 2018).
5.4. Additional Results and Ablation Studies
Attack Performance of Adversarial Distributions. First,
we explore the attack performance of the three proposed
methods (i.e., EXP, EXP-AM, and IMP-AM) for learning
the adversarial distributions. We choose Standard, ATPGD,
ADTEXP, ADTEXP-AM, and ADTIMP-AM as the target models.
For EXP, we set the optimization steps as T = 20, the
number of MC samples in each step as k = 10 to conduct
a more powerful attack. We further study the convergence
of EXP in Appendix D.1. For EXP-AM and IMP-AM, we
retrain the generator networks for each pretrained defense.
The classification results are shown in Table 4. From the
results, EXP is slightly stronger than PGD-20 while EXP-
AM and IMP-AM exhibit comparable attack power.
Table 4. Classification Accuracy of the three proposed methods
and baselines on CIFAR-10 under PGD-20, EXP, EXP-AM, and
IMP-AM attacks with  = 8/255.
Model PGD-20 EXP EXP-AM IMP-AM
Standard 0.00% 0.00% 9.24% 9.83%
ATPGD 50.03% 49.97% 50.46% 50.36%
ADTEXP 52.18% 51.96% 52.71% 52.82%
ADTEXP-AM 51.95% 51.62% 52.85% 52.72%
ADTIMP-AM 52.28% 51.46% 52.76% 52.48%
The Impact of λ. We study the impact of λ on the per-
formance of ADT. We choose ADTEXP-AM as a case study
for its fast training process and analytical entropy estima-
tion. Figure 3 shows the robustness under white-box attacks
and the average entropy of the adversarial distributions of
ADTEXP-AM trained with λ = 0.0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, and 1.0.
Generally, a larger λ leads to a larger entropy and better
robustness. But a too large λ will reduce the robustness.
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Figure 3. Classification accuracy (%) under white-box attacks and
the average entropy of the adversarial distributions of ADTEXP-AM
on CIFAR-10 trained with λ = 0.0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, and 1.0.
Loss Landscape Analysis. We conduct an additional check
against gradient masking (Athalye et al., 2018) by looking
at the loss landscape. First, we plot the cross-entropy loss
of the models projected along the gradient direction (dg)
and a random direction (dr) in the vicinity of a natural input
in Figure 4. Notably, the models trained by ADT exhibit
smoother and more flattened loss surfaces than Standard
and ATPGD, and thus deliver better robustness. We further
quantitatively measure the smoothness of loss surfaces with
the dominant eigenvalue of the Hessian matrix of the clas-
sification loss with respect to the input as a proxy. We use
1, 000 images from the test set of CIFAR-10 for calculation,
and report the mean and standard derivation in Figure 4(f).
The numbers are consistent with the visualization results
and help us confirm the superiority of ADT upon AT to
learn smooth loss surfaces and robust deep models.
Model Dominant eigenvalue
Standard 1.8301±6.3663
ATPGD 0.0242±0.0478
ADTEXP 0.0180±0.0311
ADTEXP-AM 0.0181±0.0270
ADTIMP-AM 0.0211±0.0353
(f) Comparison on the Hessian
(a) Standard
(d) ADTEXP-AM (e) ADTIMP-AM
(b) ATPGD (c) ADTEXP
Figure 4. Visualization of loss surfaces in the vicinity of a natural
input along the gradient direction (dg) and a random (Rademacher)
direction (dr) for the trained models in (a)-(e). We also report the
dominant eigenvalue of the Hessian matrix of the classification
loss with respect to the input in (f) for a quantitative comparison.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced an adversarial distributional
training framework for learning robust DNNs. We proposed
to parameterize the adversarial distributions in ADT with
three different approaches. The experiments demonstrate
the effectiveness of ADT on building robust DNNs, com-
pared with the state-of-the-art adversarial training methods.
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A. Proofs
We provide the proofs in this section.
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Assumption 1. The loss function J (p(δi),θ) is continu-
ously differentiable with respect to θ.
Assumption 2. The probability density functions of distri-
butions in P are bounded and equicontinuous.
Remark 1. For the explicit adversarial distributions de-
fined in Eqn. (9), we can assume that the mean and stan-
dard deviation of each dimension satisfy |µ(j)i | < κµ and
κloσ < σ
(j)
i < κ
up
σ , where κµ, κ
lo
σ , and κ
up
σ are constants.
Note that they can be easily satisfied since we add an en-
tropic regularization term into the training objective (6),
such that the mean cannot be too large while the standard
deviation cannot be too small or too large given Eqn. (11).
In practice, we can clip µ(j)i and σ
(j)
i if they are out of the
thresholds. Then we can prove that the density functions of
the explicit adversarial distributions defined in Eqn. (9) are
bounded and equicontinuous, satisfying Assumption 2. How-
ever, for the implicit adversarial distributions introduced in
Section 3.3, we cannot prove that Assumption 2 is satisfied.
Though unsatisfied, the experiments suggest that we can still
rely on Theorem 1 and the general algorithm for training.
Proof. Due to the diagonal covariance matrix, each dimen-
sion of pφi(δi) is independent. Thus we only consider one
dimension of δi. For clarity, we denoteµ
(j)
i ,σ
(j)
i , r
(j), u(j)i ,
and δ(j)i as µ, σ, r, u, and δ, respectively. The probability
density function of δ is (see Appendix A.2 for details)
p(δ) =
1√
2piσ
exp
(
− (
1
2 log
+δ
−δ − µ)2
2σ2
)
· 
2 − δ2
=
1√
2piσ
exp
(
− r
2
2
)
· 1
1− tanh(µ+ σr)2 ·
1

.
By calculation, we have
p(δ) =
1
4
√
2piσ
[
exp
(
− r
2
2
+ 2σr + 2µ
)
+ 2 exp
(
− r
2
2
)
+ exp
(
− r
2
2
− 2σr − 2µ
)]
≤ 1
4
√
2piσ
[
exp (2σ2 + 2µ) + 2 + exp (2σ2 − 2µ)
]
≤ 1
4
√
2piκloσ 
[
2 exp (2(κupσ )
2 + 2κµ) + 2
]
.
Hence, p(δ) is bounded. And the probability density func-
tion pφi(δi) is also bounded since it equals to the product
of p(δ) across all dimensions.
We next prove p(δ) is Lipschitz continuous at δ ∈ (−, ).
By calculating the derivative of p(δ), we have
p′(δ) =
1√
2piσ
exp
(
− (
1
2 log
+δ
−δ − µ)2
2σ2
)
·
[ 2δ
(2 − δ2)2
+
1
2 log
+δ
−δ − µ
σ2
· ( 
2 − δ2
)2]
=
1√
2piσ
exp
(
− r
2
2
)
·
[ 2 tanh(µ+ σr)
2(1− tanh(µ+ σr)2)2
+
r
σ2(1− tanh(µ+ σr)2)2
]
.
Note that although p′(δ) has a more complicated form, the
quadratic term inside exp is still − r22 . Hence, p′(δ) can
also be bounded by a constant. Then p(δ) as well as pφi(δi)
are Lipschitz continuous. The Lipschitz constant only con-
cerns with , κµ, κloσ , and κ
up
σ . Hence, the set of explicit
distributions in P with a common Lipschitz constant is
equicontinuous.
Combining the results, we prove that the probability den-
sity functions of the set of explicit adversarial distributions
defined in Eqn. (9) are bound and equicontinuous, which
satisfies Assumption 2.
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. We define
ρ(θ) = maxp(δi)∈P J
(
p(δi),θ
)
, and P∗(θ) = {p(δi) ∈
P : J (p(δi),θ) = ρ(θ)}. Then ρ(θ) is directionally differ-
entiable, and its directional derivative along the direction v
satisfies
ρ′(θ;v) = sup
p(δi)∈P∗(θ)
v>∇θJ
(
p(δi),θ
)
.
In particular, when the set P∗(θ) = {p∗(δi)} only contains
one maximizer, ρ(θ) is differentiable at θ and
∇θρ(θ) = ∇θJ
(
p∗(δi),θ
)
.
Proof. Recall that P is a set of distributions, which can be
expressed by their probability density functions. The sup-
port of these functions is contained in S and these functions
are equicontinuous by Assumption 2. S = {δ : ‖δ‖∞ ≤ }
is the allowed perturbation set. The Euclidean distance `2
defines a metric on S. We let
C(S,R) = {h : S → R|h is continuous}
be the collection of all continuous functions from S to R.
Then P is a subset of C(S,R). We let
dC(p, q) = max
δ∈S
|p(δ)− q(δ)|
for all p, q ∈ C(S,R) be a metric on C(S,R). Then we can
see that (C(S,R), dC) is a metric space.
We state the following lemma to prove that P is compact.
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Lemma 1. (Arzela`-Ascoli’s Theorem) Let (X, dX) be a
compact metric space. A subset K of C(X,R) is compact if
and only if it is closed, bounded, and equicontinuous.
Since (S, `2) is a compact metric space, and P is closed,
bounded, and equicontinuous given by Assumption 2, we
can see that P is compact by Lemma 1.
We next need to prove that the loss function J (p(δi),θ) is
continuously differentiable with respect to both p(δi) and
θ, i.e., the gradient ∇θJ
(
p(δi),θ
)
is joint continuous on
P × Rm, where m is the dimension of θ.
To prove it, we first define a new metric on P × Rm as
dmix((p1,θ1), (p2,θ2)) = dC(p1, p2) + `2(θ1,θ2).
Then (P × Rm, dmix) is a new metric space.
By definition, given a point (p0,θ0) ∈ P × Rm, if for each
τ > 0, there is a γ > 0, such that
`2
(∇θJ (p(δi),θ),∇θJ (p0(δi),θ0)) < τ
whenever dmix((p,θ), (p0,θ0)) < γ, then the function
∇θJ
(
p(δi),θ
)
is continuous at (p0,θ0). If for all points in
P × Rm, the function is continuous, then ∇θJ
(
p(δi),θ
)
is continuous on P × Rm.
To show that, we first have
`2
(∇θJ (p(δi),θ),∇θJ (p0(δi),θ0))
≤ `2
(∇θJ (p(δi),θ),∇θJ (p(δi),θ0))
+ `2
(∇θJ (p(δi),θ0),∇θJ (p0(δi),θ0)). (A.1)
We already have that the loss function J (p(δi),θ) is con-
tinuously differentiable with respect to θ by Assumption 1.
Then given τ2 , there is a γ1, such that
`2
(∇θJ (p(δi),θ),∇θJ (p(δi),θ0)) < τ
2
whenever `2(θ,θ0) < γ1.
For the second term of the RHS of Eqn. (A.1), we have
`2
(∇θJ (p(δi),θ0),∇θJ (p0(δi),θ0))
=
∥∥∇θ(J (p(δi),θ0)− J (p0(δi),θ0))∥∥2
=
∥∥∫
S
(
p(δi)− p0(δi)
)∇θL(fθ(xi + δi), yi)dδi∥∥2
≤ dC(p, p0) ·
∫
S
∥∥∇θL(fθ(xi + δi), yi)∥∥2dδi.
Therefore, for the given τ2 , there is also a γ2 which equals
to
γ2 =
τ
2
∫
S
∥∥∇θL(fθ(xi + δi), yi)∥∥2dδi ,
such that
`2
(∇θJ (p(δi),θ0),∇θJ (p0(δi),θ0)) < τ
2
whenever dC(p, p0) < γ2.
Combining the results, for a given τ > 0, we can set γ =
γ1 + γ2, such that
`2
(∇θJ (p(δi),θ),∇θJ (p0(δi),θ0)) < τ
whenever dmix((p,θ), (p0,θ0)) < γ. Thus we have proven
that the loss function J (p(δi),θ) is continuously differen-
tiable with respect to both p(δi) and θ.
Given the above results, we can directly apply Danskin’s
theorem (Danskin, 2012) to prove Theorem 1. We state the
Danskin’s theorem in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. (Danskin’s Theorem) Let Q be a nonempty
compact topological space and h : Q×Rm → R be a func-
tion satisfying that h(q, ·) is differentiable for every q ∈ Q
and∇θh(q,θ) is continuous onQ×Rm. We define Ψ(θ) =
maxq∈Q h(q,θ), andQ∗(θ) = {q ∈ Q : h(q,θ) = Ψ(θ)}.
Then Ψ(θ) is directionally differentiable, and its directional
derivative along the direction v satisfies
Ψ′(θ;v) = sup
q∈Q∗(θ)
v>∇θh(q,θ).
In particular, when the setQ∗(θ) = {q∗} only contains one
maximizer, Ψ(θ) is differentiable at θ and
∇θΨ(θ) = ∇θh(q∗,θ).
If we let Q = P and h = J in Lemma 2, we can directly
prove Theorem 1.
A.2. Proof of Eqn. (11)
The variable δi has the following sampling process
δi =  · tanh(ui), ui ∼ N (µi,diag(σ2i )),
whose negative log density is
d∑
j=1
(1
2
(r(j))2 +
log 2pi
2
+ logσ
(j)
i
+ log(1− tanh(µ(j)i + σ(j)i r(j))2) + log 
)
,
where the superscript j denotes the j-th element of a vector.
Proof. Due to the usage of the diagonal covariance matrix,
each dimension in the sampled perturbation δi is indepen-
dent. Thus we can simply calculate the negative log den-
sity in each dimension of δi. For clarity, we also denote
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µ
(j)
i , σ
(j)
i , r
(j), u(j)i , and δ
(j)
i as µ, σ, r, u, and δ, respec-
tively. Based on the sampling procedure in Eqn. (9), we
have δ =  · tanh(u) and u = µ+ σr.
Note that r has density: p(r) = 1√
2pi
exp (− r22 ). Apply the
transformation of variable approach, we have the density of
u as
p(u) =
1√
2pi
exp (−r
2
2
) · ∣∣ d
du
(
u− µ
σ
)
∣∣
=
1√
2piσ
exp (−r
2
2
).
Let β = tanh(u), then the inverse transformation is u =
tanh−1(β) = 12 log(
1+β
1−β ), whose derivative with respect to
β is 11−β2 .
Then, by applying the transformation of variable approach
again, we have the density of β as
p(β) =
1√
2piσ
exp (−r
2
2
) · 1
1− β2
=
1√
2piσ
exp (−r
2
2
) · 1
1− tanh(µ+ σr)2 .
Therefore, the density of δ which equals to  · β can be
derived similarly, and eventually we obtain
p(δ) =
1√
2piσ
exp (−r
2
2
) · 1
1− tanh(µ+ σr)2 ·
1

.
Consequently, the negative log density of p(δ) is
− log p(δ) =r
2
2
+
log 2pi
2
+ log σ
+ log(1− tanh(µ+ σr)2) + log .
Sum over all of the dimensions and we complete the proof
of Eqn. (11).
A.3. Proof of Eqn. (14)
Given an example xi, we define an implicit distribution in
the form of δi = gφ(z;xi), z ∼ p(z), where gφ denotes
a φ-parameterized generator network. Then we can maxi-
mize the following variational lower bound to maximize the
entropy of this distribution
H(pφ(δi|xi)) ≥ U(q) = Ep(z) log q(z|gφ(z;xi)) + c
where c is a constant and q(·|·) is a variational distribution.
Proof. We mainly follow Dai et al. (2017a) to provide the
proof. Typically, we can view the Dirac generation dis-
tribution pφ(δi|xi, z) as a peaked Gaussian with a fixed,
diagonal covariance, then it will have a constant entropy.
Considering xi as a given condition, we can simply rewrite
the generation distribution as pφ,i(δi|z). Then we can de-
fine the joint distribution over δi and z as pφ,i(δi, z) =
pφ,i(δi|z)pφ,i(z). pφ,i(z) = p(z) is simply a predefined
prior with a constant entropy. Then, we can further define
the marginal pφ,i(δi) whose entropy is of our interest and
the posterior pφ,i(z|δi). Consider the mutual information
between δi and z
I(pφ,i(δi); pφ,i(z)) =H(pφ,i(δi))−H(pφ,i(δi|z))
=H(pφ,i(z))−H(pφ,i(z|δi)).
Thus, we can calculate the entropy of δi as
H(pφ,i(δi)) = H(pφ,i(z))−H(pφ,i(z|δi)) +H(pφ,i(δi|z)).
As stated, the first term and the last term are constant
with respect to the parameter φ. Therefore, maximizing
H(pφ,i(δi)) corresponds to maximizing the negative condi-
tional entropy
−H(pφ,i(z|δi)) = Eδi∼pφ,i(δi)
[
Ez∼pφ,i(z|δi)[log pφ,i(z|δi)]
]
.
We still cannot optimize this as we have no access to the
posterior. As an alternative, we resort to the variational
inference technique to tackle this problem. We introduce
a variational distribution q(z|δi) to approximate the true
posterior, and derive the following lower bound
−H(pφ,i(z|δi)) = Eδi∼pφ,i(δi)
[
Ez∼pφ,i(z|δi)[log q(z|δi)]
]
+DKL(pφ,i(z|δi)||q(z|δi))
≥ Eδi∼pφ,i(δi)
[
Ez∼pφ,i(z|δi)[log q(z|δi)]
]
= Ez,δi∼pφ,i(z,δi)[log q(z|δi)]
= Ez∼pφ,i(z)
[
Eδi∼pφ,i(δi|z)[log q(z|δi)]
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
U′(q)
,
where DKL represents the KullbackLeibler divergence be-
tween distributions. Note that pφ,i(z) = p(z) is a prior and
pφ,i(δi|z) = pφ(δi|xi, z) is Dirac distribution located at
δi = gφ(z;xi). Thus, we can write the lower bound of the
entropy U(q) as
H(pφ(δi|xi)) ≥ U(q) = U ′(q) + c
= Ez∼p(z) log q(z|gφ(z;xi)) + c,
which can be optimized effectively via Monte Carlo inte-
gration and standard back-propagation. Then we finish the
proof of Eqn. (14).
B. Algorithms
In this section, we present the three proposed algorithms in
detail.
B.1. Algorithm for ADTEXP
We provide the algorithm for training ADTEXP in Alg. 2.
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Algorithm 2 The training algorithm for ADTEXP
1: Input: Training dataD, objective J (pφi(δi),θ), train-
ing epochs N , the number of inner maximization steps
T , the number of MC samples for gradient estimation
in each step k, and learning rates ηθ, ηφ.
2: Initialize θ;
3: for epoch = 1 to N do
4: for each minibatch B ⊂ D do
5: for each input (xi, yi) ∈ B do
6: Initialize φi;
7: for t = 1 to T do
8: Calculate the gradient gi of φi by Eqn. (10)
via MC integration using k samples;
9: Update φi with gradient ascent
φi ← φi + ηφ · gi.
10: end for
11: end for
12: Update θ with stochastic gradient descent
θ ← θ − ηθ · E(xi,yi)∈B
[∇θJ (pφi(δi),θ)].
13: end for
14: end for
B.2. Algorithm for ADTEXP-AM
We provide the algorithm for training ADTEXP-AM in Alg. 3.
B.3. Algorithm for ADTIMP-AM
We provide the algorithm for training ADTIMP-AM in Alg. 4.
C. Detailed Experimental Settings
We provide the detailed experimental settings in this section.
C.1. Datasets
We choose the CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky & Hin-
ton, 2009), and SVHN (Netzer et al., 2011) datasets to
conduct the experiments. CIFAR consists of a training set
of 50, 000 and a test set of 10, 000 color images of resolu-
tion 32× 32 with 10 classes in CIFAR-10 and 100 classes
in CIFAR-100. SVHN is a 10-class house number classi-
fication dataset with 73, 257 training images and 26, 032
test images. During training, we perform standard data
augmentation (i.e., horizontal flips and random crops from
images with 4 pixels padded on each side) on CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100, and use no data augmentation on SVHN.
We do not use any data augmentation during testing.
C.2. Network Architectures
For the generator network in ADTEXP-AM and ADTIMP-AM,
we adopt a popular image-to-image architecture which has
Algorithm 3 The training algorithm for ADTEXP-AM
1: Input: Training dataD, objective function in Eqn. (12),
training epochs N , and learning rates ηθ, ηφ.
2: Initialize θ and φ;
3: for epoch = 1 to N do
4: for each minibatch B ⊂ D do
5: Input xi to the generator and obtain the distribution
parameters (µi,σi) for each (xi, yi) ∈ B;
6: Sample one δi from the distribution defined by
Eqn. (9) given (µi,σi) for each (xi, yi) ∈ B to
approximately calculate the gradient of Eqn. (12)
with respect to θ and φ, and obtain gθ and gφ;
7: Update θ by: θ ← θ − ηθ · gθ.
8: Update φ by: φ← φ+ ηφ · gφ.
9: end for
10: end for
Algorithm 4 The training algorithm for ADTIMP-AM
1: Input: Training dataD, objective function in Eqn. (15),
training epochs N , and learning rates ηθ, ηφ, ηψ .
2: Initialize θ, φ, and ψ;
3: for epoch = 1 to N do
4: for each minibatch B ⊂ D do
5: For each (xi, yi) ∈ B, sample a noise zi from
U(−1, 1).
6: Use the sampled noises to approximately calculate
the gradient of Eqn. (15) with respect to θ, φ, and
ψ, and obtain gθ, gφ, and gψ .
7: Update θ by: θ ← θ − ηθ · gθ.
8: Update φ by: φ← φ+ ηφ · gφ.
9: Update ψ by: ψ ← ψ + ηψ · gψ .
10: end for
11: end for
shown promise in neural style transfer and super-resolution
(Johnson et al., 2016; Zhu et al., 2017). The network con-
tains 3 residual blocks (He et al., 2016), with two extra
convolutions at the beginning and the end. All convolutions
in the generator have stride 1, and are immediately followed
by batch normalization (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) and ReLU
activation.
As found by Chen et al. (2018), taking only the natural
images as inputs to the generator network can lead to poor
results. And they suggest to input the classifier’s gradients
as well. Based on this finding, we calculate the gradient of
the loss function at the natural input g1i = ∇xL(fθ(xi), yi),
as well as the gradient of the loss function at the FGSM
adversarial example g2i = ∇xL(fθ(xi + δFGSMi ), yi),
where δFGSMi =  · sign(∇xL(fθ(xi), yi)), and then in-
put [xi,g1i ,g
2
i ] to the generator network.
In ADTEXP-AM, the generator has 6 output channels to de-
liver the parameters (i.e., mean and standard derivation) of
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Table 5. The network architectures used for the generators.
In ADTEXP-AM In ADTIMP-AM
input z
256× 3× 3 conv 256-dim fc layer
Residual block, 512 filters 1024-dim fc layer
Residual block, 512 filters reshape to 1× 32× 32
Residual block, 512 filters concat with input
6× 3× 3 conv 256× 3× 3 conv
Residual block, 512 filters
Residual block, 512 filters
Residual block, 512 filters
3× 3× 3 conv
Table 6. The network architecture used for instantiating the varia-
tional distribution q in ADTIMP-AM.
Layers
input
32× 5× 5, stride 1
64× 4× 4, stride 2
128× 4× 4, stride 1
256× 4× 4, stride 2
Global average pooling
128× 1× 1, stride 1
the explicit adversarial distributions. In ADTIMP-AM, for
each input we sample a 64-dim i.i.d. z from a uniform distri-
bution U(−1, 1), which is encoded with 2 fully connected
(FC) layers and then fed into the generator along with the
input image and gradients.
We elaborate the architectures of the generator networks in
Table 5, and the architecture of q in ADTIMP-AM in Table 6.
In these tables, “C×H×W” means a convolutional layer
with C filters size H×W, which is followed by batch normal-
ization (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) and a ReLU nonlinearity
(or LeakyReLU for layers in Table 6), except the last layers
in the architectures. We use the residual block design of He
et al. (2016), which is composed of two 3× 3 convolutions
and a residual connection.
C.3. Training Details
The classifier is trained using SGD with momentum 0.9,
weight decay 2× 10−4, and batch size 64. The initial learn-
ing rate is 0.1, which is reduced to 0.01 in the 75-th epoch.
We stop training after 76 epochs. For ADTEXP, we adopt
Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2015) for optimizing the distribu-
tion parameters φi. We set the learning rate for φi as 0.3,
the momentum as (0.0, 0.0), the number of optimization
steps as T = 7, and the number of MC samples to estimate
the gradient in each step as k = 5. For ADTEXP-AM and
ADTIMP-AM, we use only one MC sample for gradient es-
timation and use Adam with momentum (0.5, 0.999) and
learning rate 2× 10−4 to optimize the parameter φ of the
generator network. We also adopt Adam with learning rate
2 × 10−4 to optimize the parameter ψ of the introduced
variational in ADTIMP-AM.
C.4. Baselines
Our primary baselines include: 1) standard training on the
clean images (Standard); 2) adversarial training on the
PGD adversarial examples (ATPGD) (Madry et al., 2018).
Standard and ATPGD are trained with the same configura-
tions specified above. For training ATPGD, we perform PGD
with T = 7 steps, and step size α = /4, which are the same
as in Madry et al. (2018). On CIFAR-10, we incorporate
several additional baselines, including: 1) adversarial train-
ing on the targeted FGSM adversarial examples (ATFGSM)
(Kurakin et al., 2017); 2) adversarial logit pairing (ALP)
(Kannan et al., 2018); and 3) feature scattering-based ad-
versarial training (FeaScatter) (Zhang & Wang, 2019). We
implement ATFGSM and ALP by ourselves using the same
training configuration specified above and use the pretrained
model of FeaScatter. Note that all of these models have the
same network architecture for a fair comparison.
C.5. A Feature Attack for White-box Evaluation
We incorporate a feature attack (FeaAttack)4 for white-box
robustness evaluation in this paper. The algorithm of FeaAt-
tack is introduced below. Given a natural input x, FeaAttack
first finds a target image x′ belonging to a different class. It
minimizes the cosine similarity between the feature repre-
sentations of the adversarial example and x′ as
δ∗ = arg min
δ∈S
Lcos(f ′θ(x+ δ), f ′θ(x′)),
where f ′θ(·) returns the feature representation before the
global average pooling layer for an input, and Lcos is the
cosine similarity between two features. FeaAttack solves
this objective function by
δt+1 = ΠS
(
δt − α · sign(∇xLcos(f ′θ(x+ δt), f ′θ(x′)))
)
.
δ0 is initialized uniformly in S . In our experiments, we set
α = /8 and the number of optimization steps as 50. For
each natural input, we randomly select 200 target images
to conduct 200 attacks, and report a successful attack when
one of them can cause misclassification of the model.
D. Supplementary Experimental Results
We provide more experimental results in this section.
D.1. Convergence of Learning the Explicit Adversarial
Distributions
We study the convergence of the explicit adversarial distri-
butions introduced in Section 3.1 by attacking ATPGD and
4https://github.com/Line290/FeatureAttack.
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Table 7. Classification accuracy of TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019) and the three ADT-based methods trained with the TRADES loss on
CIFAR-10 under white-box attacks with  = 8/255. We mark the best results for each attack and the overall results that outperform
TRADES in bold, and the overall best result in blue.
Model Anat FGSM PGD-20 PGD-100 MIM C&W FeaAttack Arob
TRADES 83.89% 59.79% 53.92% 53.68% 54.78% 52.71% 54.38% 51.67%
ADTEXP w. TRADES 84.89% 60.23% 54.96% 54.56% 55.72% 52.96% 54.96% 52.13%
ADTEXP-AM w. TRADES 84.86% 60.43% 55.22% 55.00% 55.68% 52.30% 57.91% 51.77%
ADTIMP-AM w. TRADES 83.95% 65.61% 55.87% 54.79% 54.14% 52.82% 58.80% 51.81%
ADTEXP with different attack iterations. We set the learning
rate ofφi as 0.3, the momentum as (0.0, 0.0), the number of
MC samples to estimate the gradient in each step as k = 10,
and vary the attack iterations from 0 to 100. We show the
classification loss and accuracy in Figure 5. Learning the
explicit adversarial distributions can converge soon within a
few iterations.
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Figure 5. Classification loss (i.e., cross-entropy loss) and accuracy
(%) of ATPGD and ADTEXP under the explicit adversarial distribu-
tions attack with different attack iterations.
D.2. Training Time
We provide the training time for one epoch of Standard,
ATPGD, ADTEXP, ADTEXP-AM, and ADTIMP-AM on CIFAR-
10 in Figure 6. As can be seen, ADTEXP is nearly 5× slower
than ATPGD since we use k = 5 MC samples to estimate
the gradient with respect to the distribution parameters in
each step. Nevertheless, by amortizing the adversarial distri-
butions, ADTEXP-AM and ADTIMP-AM are much faster than
ADTEXP, and nearly 2× faster than ATPGD.
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Figure 6. The training time (s) for one epoch of Standard, ATPGD,
ADTEXP, ADTEXP-AM, and ADTIMP-AM on CIFAR-10.
D.3. Comparison with Zhang et al. (2019)
Although we use the cross-entropy loss as our training objec-
tive in most of the experiments, our proposed ADT frame-
work is compatible with other loss functions. As a concrete
example, we integrate TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019) with
ADT. In TRADES, the minimax optimization problem is
formulated as
min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
{
L(fθ(xi), yi)+max
δi∈S
L(fθ(xi+δi), fθ(xi))/λ′
}
,
where L is the cross-entropy loss5, λ′ is a different hyper-
parameter from λ in our proposed method. We similarly
implement ADT with TRADES by replacing the loss func-
tion in Eqn. (6) with the TRADES loss.
Since we use a smaller network architecture with 28 layers
while Zhang et al. (2019) use a 34-layer Wide ResNet, we
reimplement TRADES with WRN-28-10. We set 1/λ′ = 6
for all models. Table 7 shows the classification accuracy of
TRADES and the three ADT-based methods trained with the
TRADES loss on CIFAR-10 under white-box attacks. Our
methods can also improve the robustness upon TRADES.
D.4. Comparison with Chen et al. (2018)
We further compare ADT with the L2L framework in Chen
et al. (2018). Their method is similar to ours in the sense that
they also adopt a generator network to produce adversarial
examples, and perform adversarial training on those gener-
ated adversarial examples. The essential different between
our methods and theirs is that we propose an adversarial
distributional training framework to learn the distributions
of adversarial perturbations, while their method is a variant
of the vanilla adversarial training with a different approach
to solving the inner maximization.
Since the source code is not provided by Chen et al. (2018),
we tried to reproduce their reported results with the same
training configuration specified in their paper, but we failed.
Therefore, we adopt the same configuration as in ADT for
training the L2L model. Table 8 shows the results of L2L,
ADTEXP-AM, and ADTIMP-AM, which use the same classifier
5In the code provided by Zhang et al. (2019), the second term
is implemented by the KL divergence.
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Table 8. Classification Accuracy of L2L (Chen et al., 2018),
ADTEXP-AM, and ADTIMP-AM on CIFAR-10 under white-box at-
tacks with  = 8/255.
Model L2L ADTEXP-AM ADTIMP-AM
Anat 88.15% 87.82% 88.00%
FGSM 65.50% 62.42% 64.89%
PGD-20 48.55% 51.95% 52.28%
PGD-100 47.14% 51.26% 51.23%
MIM 49.03% 52.99% 52.64%
C&W 49.22% 51.75% 52.65%
architecture and generator network. Our ADT-based meth-
ods outperform L2L in most cases, showing the advantages
of learning the distributions of adversarial perturbations
upon finding a single adversarial example.
